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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, ) 
E. L. 
STATE 
PETITIONER ) 
vs. } No. 6640 
MAXWELL, WARDEN, } 
OF OHIO, ex re 1. , 
) 
RESPONDENTS 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
I. DID THE PUBLICITY RELATING TO THE PETITIONER DEPRIVE 
HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL? 
There are two periods of time which must be examined to 
determine whether or not petitioner was prejudiced by the publicity 
involved in this case. Those two periods are: 1. the period of 
time between the discovery of the murder and the impanelling of the 
jury, and 2. the period of time between the impanelling of the jury 
and the return of its verdict of guilty. 
A. BEFORE TRIAL 
With respect to the period of time prior to the final impanelling 
of the jury, pages 20 and 21 of the petitioner's petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio set forth headlines 
appearing in Cleveland newspapers for approximately three weeks after the 
murder on July 4, 1954. Despite the alleged sensationalistic nature of 
the journalistic effort, the major thrust of the articles and editorials 
was to seek the arrest of the chief suspect, Dr. Samuel Sheppard. Further, 
these alleged prejudicial headlines occurred about ten weeks prior to 
the commencement of the trial on October 18, 1954. 
No one can doubt the effect of such a sustained and unre-
mitting journalistic effort. Any incident which receives a dis-
portionate amount of publicity loses its footing in terms of eva1-
uation within an objective context. Yet, this is not the issue to 
be decided. The objectivity of the press is not the standard. The 
guideline which has been laid down by the United States Supreme Court 
is: 
"To hold that the mere existence of any pre-
conceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an 
accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality 
would be to establish an impossible standard. It 
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his im-
pression or opinion and render a verdict based on 
the evidence presented in court. 11 (Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 u. s. 717' 723 ( 1961)). 
An examination of the Irvin case and the case of Rideau~· 
State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct., 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d, 663 
(1963), (perhaps the two cases most favorable to petitioner's position) 
wi 11 reveal where the United States Supreme Court has drawn the boun-
daries for what constitutes a fair trial in the face of adverse publicity. 
served: 
In the Irvin case, supra, the following characteristics are ob-
1. It was a small community (30,000); 
2. There were six brutal murders in the vicinity; 
3. There was vast coverage by news media; 
4. There was never any expressions as to doubt concerning 
the defendant's guilt; 
5. Prior criminal record of the accused was published; 
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6. A confession by the defendant was given wide play; 
7. Ninety per cent of the 370 prospective jurors enter-
tained so~e opinion as to guilt ranging from mere 
suspicion to absolute certainty; 
8. Eight of the twelve jurors expressed the opinion that 
the defendant was guilty; 
9. A pattern of deep and bitter prejudice existed through-
out the community. 
The factors surrounding the Rideau case are as follows: 
1. It was a relatively small community (150,000); 
2. Vast coverage by the news media; 
3. Two of the jurors were law enforcement officials; 
4. A television tape was run three times to audiences 
of 24,000, 53,000, and 29,000 which showed the de-
fendant confessing in detai 1 to the crimes; 
5. At the time of the confession the defendant had no 
counse 1. 
Such a pattern of facts reveals the situation that caused the 
United States Supreme Court to reverse both convictions. 
At page 666 of the Rideau case, supra, the Court characterized 
the television coverage prior to the trial as "Rideau's trial." Yet, 
the court is not necessarily condemning "pub 1 i city per se"; the court 
is condemning publicity of such a prejudicial nature that the entire 
area from which the venire wi 11 be drawn is so saturated with biased 
information concerning the offense and the past record of the petitioner 
that it can be said the defendant was "tried" and found gui 1 ty before he 
reached the courtroom. 
The State of Ohio contends that such was not the case in the 
Sheppard case. Cleveland is not a town of thirty or one hundred and 
fifty thousand people. It was a cosmopolitan goliath of some 914,000 
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people according to the 1950 census. In the Sheppard case 
there had not been six brutal murders or several crimes. The 
entire community was not then convinced that Dr. Sheppard had 
done away with his wife. This is to be contrasted with the 
general community belief of guilt in the Irvin and Rideau cases. 
In the Irvin case, the fact that the accused had a criminal record 
was spread throughout the community. Here there is some parallel 
with the Sheppard case but it is far different for one to have 
been convicted of a crime than to have been accused of marital 
infidelity. The reports appearing in 1he papers were not one 
sided as in the Rideau and Irvin Cases, supra. As a matter of 
fact, reports appeared in the papers declaring the innocence of the 
pe ti ti oner. "The pe ti ti oner's 'own story' was headlined in unus ua l1 y 
bold type on the front page of one Cleveland daily prior to trial." 
(Exhibit 1, page 10) 
In both the Rideau and Irvin cases the invidious influence 
of a confession was involved. Whereas, Dr. Sheppard contended 
throughout the entire investigation and trial that he was innocent. 
The tremendous weight that a confession played in the prior cases 
is apparent. 
"For we hold that it was a denial of due 
process of law to refuse the request for a change 
of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had 
been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle 
of Rideau personally confessing in detai 1 to the 
crimes with which he was later to be charged. For 
anyone who has ever watched television the conclu-
sion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the 
tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, 
in a very real sense was Rideau's trial -- at which 
he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court 
proceeding in a community so pervasively exposed to 
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such a spectacle could be but a hollow formal! ty. 11 
Rideau, id., at page 665. 
All of the above factors suggest that the deep-rooted 
prejudice that existed in the Rideau and Irvin cases did not 
exist in the Sheppard case. 
This conclusion is borne out by the results that can be 
derived from an analysis of the~ dire examination. Counsel 
for the petitioner at the trial stage summed up the results of 
the !'.2!L dire examination by stating at page 1352 of the record: 
11 ;': -J: ;': A 11 the people si tti ng on the 
jury with the exception of Mrs. Borke, Juror No. 2, 
have read about this case, a great many have heard 
radio and television, and we sti 11 maintain that 
even though they express no opinion, that human 
nature is such that they cannot help but be effected 
by the situation presented from the beginning of 
this -- the happening of this murder down to the 
present time. 11 (Emphasis added) 
Since the voir dire examination disclosed that there would 
be no deep-rooted prejudice prevalent in the community against him, 
the juro~did not have a fixed opinion as to guilt, and that petitioner 
cannot claim that the publicity his case received prior to the impanelling 
of the jury deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of the 
United States has suggested that if an accused is tried by a jury 
which has no fixed opinion as to the guilt of the accused, then 
such a jury far exceeds the standard established in the Irvin case, 
supra. 
"Although most of the persons selected for 
the trial jury had been exposed to some of the pub-
licity related above, each individual indicated that 
he was not biased, that he had formed no opinion as 
to petitioner's guilt which would require evidence 
to remove, and that he would enter the trial with an 
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open mind disregarding anything he had read on 
the case. 
11A study of the voi r di re indicates clearly 
that each jurors' qualifications as to impartiality 
far exceeded the minimum standards this Court es-
tablished in its earlier cases as well as in Irvin 
~·c ~·: ·k. 11 Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 557, 
8 L Ed 2d 98, 111, 82 S. Ct. 955 (1962). 
The trial judge, exercising his discretion, went forward 
with the task of impanelling the jury. Rizzo~· U.S., 304 F. 2d 810, 
815 (1962). No where in the record is it revealed that any of those 
who sat on the jury had formed a fixed opinion as to the gui It of 
the accused. After an examination of the relevant factors surround-
ing the Sheppard jury and the publicity in the community, respondent 
finds that it can merely repeat the words of the United States Dis-
trict Court in United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 
(1962): 
"Pub 1i ci ty, in and of ~ tse 1f does not, fore-
c 1 os ea fair trial. The courts do not function in 
a vacuum and jurors are not required to be totally 
ignorant of what goes on about them. ·k * ~·c 11 
It is clear that the Supreme Court of Ohio used the same 
test set forth in the Beck case, supra, in order to ascertain 
whether petitioner could receive a fair trial. Quoting from 
Exhibit four, page three of the Ohio Supreme Court opinion: 
"The examination of jurors in their voir 
dire affords the best test as to whether or not 
prejudice exists in the community against the de-
fendant; and where it appears that the opinion as 
to the guilt of the defendant of those called for 
examination for jurors are based on newspaper ar-
ticles and that the opinions so formed are not 
fixed but would yield readily to evidence, it is 
not error to over rule an application for a change 
of venue. 11 
- 6 -
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This statement has been supported by numerous federal cases. 
"The on 1 y p rac ti cal way to conduct a c ri mi na l 
trial with reasonable certainty that the jury wi 11 
be uninfluenced by publicity is by careful examina-
tion of the jurors in the first instance, and a con-
stant repetition of the admonition to the jurors not 
to receive any outside information about the case, 
followed by inquiry to insure that the instructions 
are obeyed." U.S. y_. Kline, 205 F. Supp 776, 786 
( 1963). 
'~hether or not the publicity has been of 
such a nature that the selection of a fair and im-
partial jury is foreclosed at this time can not be 
determined unti 1 the jurors are questioned on voir 
dire." U.S. v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp 921 at 924 
(1962). 
Thus, we see in examining the period of time between the 
discovery of the murder and the impanelling of the jury, the pub-
licity petitioner received did not deprive him of a fair trial. 
A comment is deemed necessary at this time with respect to 
the issue petitioner raises relating to the publication of a list 
of veniremen thirty days in advance of trial, any possible prejudice 
resulting therefrom would have been disclosed during the voir dire 
examination and counsel for petitioner could have had such pros-
pective juror removed from the case. Accordingly this issue has 
no merit. 
Further, petitioner failed to raise this issue on appeal 
(Exhibit 1) and thus such issue is not properly before this Court. 
- 7 -
B. DURING TRIAL 
The petitioner has also asserted that during the period 
of time between the impanelling of the jury and the return of its 
verdict of guilty, he was deprived of a fair trial because of four 
incidents which occurred, to wit: 
1) during the trial, newspaper pictures were taken inside 
the home of an alternate juror, showing how the family fared while 
the juror was at court; 
2) a broadcast by Walter Winchell relating a story of a 
woman who claimed she was the mistress of petitioner and that he 
was responsible for the birth of a chi Id; 
3) a broadcast by Bob ConsidLne who announced over the 
radio a comparison between Alger Hiss and the petitioner; 
4) the appearance in the newspaper, November 24, 196"1\ of 
a double-column headline on the front page as follows: 
"SAM CALLED A JEKYLL-HYDE BY MARILYN, 
COUSIN TO TESTIFY" 
In considering the above-mentioned complaints it is neces-
sary to keep in mind the following legal principles: 
The mere fact of unfavorable publicity does not of itself 
raise a presumption of prejudice but prejudice must manifest itself 
so as to corrupt due process. Dennis~· U.S., 302 F 2d 5 (1962). 
Mere exposure to adverse publicity does not necessarily result in 
bias, prejudgment or other disqualification. U.S.~· Applegarth, 
206 F. Supp. 686, 687 (1962). The mere fact that a juror has read 
newspaper accounts relative to a criminal charge is not in itself 
sufficient grounds for excusing a jury. Blumenfield y. U.S., 284 
F. 2d 46, 51 ( 1960) • 
- 8 -
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With respect to the newspaper pictures taken inside the 
home of an alternate juror, respondent contends that the trial judge 
adequately disposed of this point when he stated in his memorandum 
on motion for a new trial, Exhibit 1, page 9: 
'~hatever the legal or ethical considerations, 
the incident proved to be a nullity in this case. The 
juror (Mrs. Mancini) was an alternate juror; her ser-
vices were not finally needed; she was discharged at 
the close of the presentation of the court's charge 
to the jury and took no part whatever in the jury's 
deliberations or the rendition of the verdict. There 
is not a suggestion that Mrs. Mancini was influenced 
in any manner, nor that she even knew of the matter at 
that time. It certainly cannot be claimed that the 
other jurors cared anything about it, nor is it even 
c 1 aimed that they knew of i t." 
With regard to the broadcast by Walter Winchell relating the 
story of a woman who claimed to be the mistress of petitioner, respond-
ent avers that this report could not have resulted in any substantial 
prejudice to petitioner. There had already been presented into evi-
dence testimony to the effect that petitioner had been having extra-
marital relations with other women, Miss Susan Hayes in particular 
(page 4846 of the record). Further, the jury had been admonished 
not to consider any reports which they heard outside the courtroom. 
Also at page 5429 of the record it is indicated that only two of the 
jurors heard the broadcast and that both of those jurors stated it 
would not have any effect upon their judgment. 
Bob Considine said that the denial of guilt by the petitioner 
to a police officer and the denial of Alger Hiss when he was confronted 
by Whittaker Chambers was in the same category. 
This comparison did not convey to the jurors any information 
they did not receive in the trial. The police officer testified on 
- 9 -
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the witness stand about petitioner's denial of guilt. All that 
was related to the jury was a fact situation, presented in evidence, 
and Mr. Considine's inference therefrom. Merely because Mr. Considine 
drew a particular inference does not necessarily mean the juror's 
would draw the same inference. Surely, this one broadcast is not 
enough to affirmatively show petitioner was deprived of a fair trial 
by impartial jurors. The presumption would seem to be that jurors 
are far more likely to rely on testimony that takes place before their 
eyes than the inanities of this particular newscaster. 
Petitioner has also claimed that a broadcast by Bob Considine 
who announced over the radio a comparison between Alger Hiss and 
the petitioner resulted in prejudice to him. Since the court did 
not question the jurors to see who had heard that report, respondent 
wi 11 assume the position that even if all the jurors heard that pre-
sentation, it did not result in prejudice to the petitioner. 
Again, it must be kept in mind that the trial court had con-
sistently admonished the jury not to consider out-of-court declarations 
relating to the case. In connection with this point it is important 
to note that our jury system is based upon the assumption that juries 
wi 11 endeavor to follow the Court's instructions. Delli Paoli y. United 
States, 352 U.S. 232, 242, 77 S. Ct. 294, 1 L. Ed 2d, 278 (1957). And 
as was stated in Holt y. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 
L. Ed., 1021 (1910) at 251: 
"If the mere opportunity for prejudice or 
corruption is to raise a presumption that they ex-
ist, it wi 11 be hard to maintain jury trial under 
the conditions of the present day . 11 
- JO -
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Petitioner has further claimed that the appearance in the 
newspaper of November 24, 1954, of a double-column headline asserting 
that a cousin was to testify that Sam was called a Jekyll-Hyde by 
Marilyn prejudiced him. Petitioner further asserts that no such 
testimony was presented at the trial in support of that allegation. 
Page 4266 of the record discloses that the above newspaper 
article was presented to the Court in support of a motion for contin-
uance of the case. It is important to note that counsel for the 
petitioner did not request the Court to examine the jurors to see 
if they had read or seen that particular article. Counsel only 
moved that a continuance of the case be granted. Since it is to 
be presumed that the juror's followed the Court's instructions, 
Delli Paoli, supra, and did not read any information relating to 
the case which was given outside the courtroom, it is clear that 
a reason for a continuance of the case was not existant. Only by 
an examination of the individual jurors would it be ascertained 
whether a juror had read the newspaper article. Since counsel 
for petitioner did not affirmatively show, either at the trial 
by requesting the Court to examine the jurors as to the prejudicial 
effect of the article or in this habeas corpus proceeding by an 
affidavit demonstrating the adverse effect of that article, re-
spondent maintains that the petitioner has not sustained his burden 
of proving he was prejudiced at his trial. 
Accordingly, respondent urges this Court to reject this 
particular claim of the petitioner as the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the claims of Stroble in the case of Stroble_y. California, 
343 U.S. 181, 195, 96 L. ed 872, 883, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952) when they 
held: 
- 11 -
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11 Indeed, at no stage of the proceedings 
has petitioner offered so much as an affidavit 
to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced 
by the newspaper stories. He asks this Court 
simply to read those stories and then to declare, 
over the contrary findings of two state courts, 
that they necessarily deprived him of due process. 
That we cannot do, at least where, as here, the 
inflammatory newspaper accounts appeared approxi-
mately six weeks before the beginning of petition-
er1s trial, and there is no affirmative showing 
that any community prejudice ever existed or in 
any way affected the deliberations of the jury." 
It should be noted that there was a revival of publicity 
in the Stroble case, supra, as the trial commenced (343 U.S. at 
193, 96 L. ed., at 882). Thus to that extent the Stroble case 
is on all fours with the case at bar. 
In conclusion, respondent maintains that the petitioner 
has not affirmatively shown that he was deprived of a fair trial 
due to the publicity his case received both prior to and subsequent 
to the impanelling of the jury. It is clear that one who seeks to 
have a federal court set aside a state criminal conviction has 11 the 
burden of showing essential unfairness ***not as a matter of 
speculation but as a demonstrable reality. 11 United States, ex rel. 
Darcy~· Handy, 3~ U.S. 454, 462, 76 S.Ct. 965, 100 L. ed. 1331 
(1956). 
Further, it should be kept in mind that 11 the trial judge has 
a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice from the reading 
by jurors of news articles concerning the trial. 11 Marshall v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L. ed 2d 1250 (1959). 
Also, while the Supreme Court has a supervisory power over 
federal judicial proceedings, it has stated there is "a duty of pre-
ference to the authority of the State over local administration of 
justice. 11 
- 12 -
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And finally, the question whether jurors are impartial in 
the constitutional sense is one of mixed law and fact as to which 
the challenger has the burden of persuasion, for: "Unless he shows 
the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror 
as wi 11 raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not 
necessarily be set aside •r •r •r." Reynolds y_. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 157, 25 L.ed. 244, quoted with approval in Irvin y. Dowd, 
supra. 
With reference to the fact the jurors were allowed to go 
to their homes each night during the trial and were not sequestered 
unti 1 after the Court's charge, it has been held that whether to 
keep the jury together in the trial of a capital case is discre-
tionary, and that the trial court's action in that respect wi 11 
not be reviewed, unless it appears affirmatively that prejudice 
resulted to the defendant. Wheeler y_. U.S., 165 F. 2d 225 (1947), 
cert. denied. 68 S. Ct. 448, 333 U.S. 829, 92 L. ed 1115; ~ y_. 
Hudspeth, 189 F. 2d 300 (1951). Further, petitioner has not shown 
that he requested that the jury be sequestered during the trial 
or that the jury was not properly instructed prior to separation. 
- 13 -
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II. ~JAS THE PETITIONER DEPRIVED OF A "PUBLIC" TRIAL? 
The petitioner has asserted that the action of the trial 
court in setting aside the major portion of the courtroom for 
representatives of the news media was violative of his right to 
a "public 11 trial. 
Respondent contends that the trial court was justified 
in its actions and that the Court's reasons as set forth in his 
memorandum on motion for new trial (Exhibit 1, pages 6 & 7) ade-
quately explain his behavior: 
11Rea li zing that the case had caught the pub-
1 i c imagination to an extent leading national and, 
indeed, international news media to decide to fully 
11cover 11 the trial, and having requests for space 
from many of them, the court decided to make proper 
arrangements before trial and to control the situa-
tion so as to minimize and, if possible, eliminate 
confusion during the trial. The courtroom is small. 
The court assigned specific seats to individual cor-
respondents in the rear of the courtroom and back of 
the trial area, and issued orders that there was to 
be no crowding or congregating at the front end en-
trances (one on each side of the bench) of the court-
room; that there was to be no passing back and forth 
through trial area and that all entries to and movings 
out of the courtroom be via the public doorway in the 
rear of the courtroom. Members of the defendant's 
family were accommodated with seats at all times dur~ 
ing the trial. The same was accorded members of the 
family of the murdered Marilyn. Members of the gen-
eral public were admitted to the extent of the seating 
capacity of the courtroom and a scheme of rotation was 
established so that many persons attended some sessions 
of the trial and no favored members of the general pub-
lic were present at all times, nor permitted to be. 11 
The size of the courtroom is 52 feet by 21 feet. In order 
to accomodate all classes of persons, the petitioner's family, the 
deceased's family, the press, and the general public, certain arrange-
ments had to be made. At all times there were representatives from 
- 14 -
each of the above classes present in the courtroom. Thus the 
trial was not, by the order of the trial court, rendered a se-
cret trial, but was even more so a public trial than most trials 
are. The Court of Appeals held with respect to this issue: 
"It is claimed also that the court arranged 
the courtroom to accomodate a great many representatives 
of the press, radio and television and other news-dis-
seminating agencies, thus restricting accommodations 
avai !able for others. The record shows that the de-
fendant's family was provided for and that the defend-
ants brother Dr. Stephen Sheppard, although a witness, 
was permitted by order of the court to remain in the 
courtroom throughout the trial. The court in this 
case was presented with a very difficult matter because 
of the unusual amount of coverage attempted by the press, 
radio and television agencies. The arrangements made by 
the court were within its sound discretion. Certainly 
the defendant was afforded a public trial, and from a 
reading of the record, we cannot say that the court in 
seeking to maintain an orderly proceeding abused its 
discretion in directing the courtroom arrangements." 
(Exhibit 2, page 36) 
In connection with this issue it should be noted that the 
Sixth Amendment's guaranty of a "public" trial in criminal cases 
does not apply to trials in state criminal prosecutions. Gaines 
~·Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 72 L. ed 793, 48 S. Ct. 468 (1928); 
Phillips~· Nash, 311 F. 2d 513 (1962). And in Melanson~· O'Brien, 
191 F. 2d 963 (1951) it was declared that in determining whether one 
convicted of a crime in a state court at a trial from which the public 
was excluded is denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, decisions of the federal courts dealing with the right to a 
public trial in a federal criminal prosecution are not controlling, 
as the question whether the exclusion of the general public from the 
courtroom is a violation of the specific guaranty of a "public trial" 
contained in the Sixth Amendment is different from the question of 
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whether such an exclusion is a violation of the more general 
guaranty of due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Further, in considering whether the petitioner was de-
prived of a "public" trial the case of Levine y_. United States, 
362 U.S. 610, 4 L. ed 2d 989, 80 S. Ct. 1038 (1960) should be 
noted wherein it was stated with reference to "public" trials 
that: 
"This is not a case where it is or could be 
charged that the judge deliberately enforced secrecy 
in order to be free of the safeguards of the public 
scrutiny; nor is it urged that publicity would in 
the slightest have effected the conduct of the pro-
ceedings or their result. Nor are we dealing with 
a situation where prejudice, attributable to secrecy 
is found to be sufficiently impressive to render ir-
relevant failure to make a timely objection at pro-
ceedings like these.'' 362 U.S. at 619, 4 L. ed 2d at 
997. 
Although the above-quote is referring to the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of a 1'pub1i c" tri a 1 it shows that it is mandatory for peti-
tioner to demonstrate evidence of prejudice in order to show the in-
fringement of such a right. Petitioner has not done so. He has 
not shown that he was deprived at the trial of the presence, aid, or 
counsel of any person whose presence might have been of advantage to 
him. 
Even though there is a specific guarantee of a "public" trial 
in the Sixth Amendment imposed in federal trials, as distinguished 
from the more general rights guaranteed by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that even the Sixth Amendment's 
guarantee is subject to restriction. In Geise~· United States, 262 
F. 2d 151, ret. den. 265 F. 2d, 659 (1958), cert. den. 361 U.S. 842, 
4 L. ed 2d, 80, 80 S. Ct. 94, it was held that one convicted of rape 
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of an 8-year-old child could not claim that he had been denied 
the "public trial'' which the Sixth Amendment guarantees, merely 
because all spectators were excluded except: (1) members of the 
press, (2) members of the bar, (3) relatives or close friends of 
the defendant, and (4) relatives or close friends of witnesses 
whose ages were, respectively, 7 years, 9 years, and 11 years. 
The court said that despite the exclusion the trial was a public 
tri a 1. 
And in United States y. Kobli, 172 F 2d 9J9 (1949 CA 3, Pa.) 
it was held that the constitutional right to a public trial does not 
require that spectators having no immediate concern with the trial be 
admitted in such numbers as to overcrowd the courtroom. 
Since this is a State trial, petitioner wi 11 have to demon-
strate that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause guarantees 
a "public" trial in state criminal prosecutions. Assuming he can so 
demonstrate, respondent contends that a "public" trial was given to 
the petitioner as there was no general exclusion of the public. Re-
spondent further alleges that if this Court finds a "public" trial 
was not afforded to the petitioner, he waived such a right by not 
objecting to the Court's order when it was first implemented. Levine 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619, 4 L. ed 2d 989, 997, 80 S. Ct., 
1038 ( 1960). 
The respondent is aware that the petitioner is going to pre-
sent statements to the effect that the trial judge expressed his be-
lief in the guilt of the petitioner before the trial commenced. 
Accordingly, respondent invites the Court's attention to the recent 
case of Hendrix v. ~· 312 F. 2d (1962) wherein the Court of 
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Appeals, in a habeas corpus proceeding held that the mere fact 
that a trial judge in a state criminal prosecution signed a 
statement in advance of trial relating to the judge's belief 
that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged did not 
establish any infringement of defendant's right to a fair 
tri a 1. 
Respectfully submitted, 
i/ If ?Ii///&_ ~LIAM~~ 
General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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